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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of
the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions.  The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Macroeconomic and
Development Policies Branch, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research carried out under the project is coordinated by Professor Dani Rodrik,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The research papers are
discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings of  the G-24 Technical
Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers and Deputies in their
preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of the IMF’s International
Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) and the Joint IMF/
IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums. Previously, the research
papers for the G-24 were published by UNCTAD in the collection International Monetary
and Financial Issues for the 1990s.  Between 1992 and 1999 more than 80 papers were
published in 11 volumes of this collection, covering a wide range of monetary and
financial issues of major interest to developing countries. Since the beginning of 2000
the studies are published jointly by UNCTAD and the Center for International
Development at Harvard University in the G-24 Discussion Paper Series.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and the Government of
Denmark, as well as contributions from the countries participating in the meetings of
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Abstract
This paper examines the role of competition policy in emerging markets from a developmental
and international perspective. The main issues addressed include the following:
• The state of competition and competition policy in developing countries;
• The relationship between competition, competition policy and economic development;
• The implications of the recent new advances in the theory of industrial organization for
competition policy;
•  The current international merger wave and its impact on developing countries;
• Multilateral competition policy and the establishment of an International Competition
Authority (ICA).
The paper’s main conclusions include the following:
• Contrary to conventional wisdom, many different kinds of evidence suggest that the
intensity of competition in leading emerging markets is certainly no less, if not greater,
than that observed in advanced countries.
• Analysis and evidence indicates that maximum competition is not necessarily optimal,
in terms of dynamic efficiency, i.e. maximization of an economy’s long-term productivity
growth.
• Even if it was not required in the past, developing countries need a competition policy
today, because of the huge international merger movement as well as privatization and
deregulation in these economies themselves.
• There is little evidence to indicate that the current international merger wave will enhance
global economic efficiency. Giant cross-border mergers, as well as those occurring
between large firms within advanced countries, could, however, adversely affect
competition and contestability in developing countries and the world economy. Even
with competition policies, developing countries may not be able to restrain anti-
competitive behaviour by large multinationals.
• The current competition policies in the United States and the European Union are
unsuitable for developing countries. Countries at different levels of development and
governance capacities require different types of competition policies. A good model for
many emerging countries with effective governance structures is that of the Japanese
competition policy during 1950–1973. The Japanese used both competition and
cooperation to promote rapid industrialization.
The paper presents a proposal for a development-oriented international competition authority
to control anti-competitive conduct and growth by mergers of large multinationals. It is argued
here that the current discourse on the development dimension of competition policy at the WTO
is unsatisfactory; its terms and language need to be radically changed. The ultimate aim of the
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I. Introduction: competition policy
and developing countries –
the international context
Developing countries are today faced with a
range of new issues related to the microeconomic
behaviour of economic agents – individuals, house-
holds and corporations – in these societies. In the
past such behaviour, and a country’s institutional
arrangements which supported it, have been the pre-
rogatives of sovereign nation states. However, with
liberalization and globalization these matters are to-
day regarded as legitimate objects of attention by
the international community. Hence, under the new
International Financial Architecture which is being
constructed following the Asian crisis, emerging
countries are being asked to reform their systems of
corporate governance, labour laws, competition
policy and other similar institutional structures. With
respect to competition policy, which is the subject
of this paper, it is suggested by many policy makers
that not only do developing countries require a com-
petition policy, but a multilateral one would be
greatly to their advantage.
The main purpose of this paper is to brief de-
veloping countries on the complexities of this issue
as well as its important policy implications for eco-
nomic development. The paper will examine the
virtues and limitations of both national and interna-
tional competition policies.
Contrary to the wishes of developing countries,
the so-called “Singapore issues” were included in
the WTO’s November 2001 Doha Declaration of
Ministers: these are investment, competition policy,
trade facilitation and government procurement. Com-
petition policy was put on the agenda at the
Singapore Ministerial meeting in 1996 as part of a
review of the relationship between trade and invest-
ment. As this topic was being included in the WTO’s
work program – even at that time over the objec-
tions of developing countries – it was agreed that
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the matter should be studied by a working group with
a remit to pay particular attention to the develop-
ment dimension of competition policy. This was to
be without prejudice to the question of any prospec-
tive negotiations on the subject.1 However, five years
later at Doha, in one of the more confusing para-
graphs of the Declaration, Ministers “agreed that
negotiations will take place after the fifth Session of
the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a deci-
sion to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session
on modalities of negotiations.” Many, but by no
means all,2 developed countries consider this as a
mandate to launch negotiations at the fifth Ministe-
rial in 2003 or shortly thereafter, whereas most
developing countries maintain that the negotiations
may be years off, as a decision to launch them must
be taken by “explicit consensus”. Much of this diver-
gence arises from the undefined word “modalities”,
which countries choose to interpret in different
ways.3
At India’s request, Yussef Hussain Kamal, the
Conference Chair at Doha, presented the following
clarification: “In my view, this would give each
Member the right to take a position on modalities
that would prevent negotiations from proceeding af-
ter the fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference
until that Member is prepared to join in an explicit
consensus.” As the clarification seems to express
only a personal view, the legal status of the Chair’s
statement remains unclear. It is not formally attached
to the Ministerial Declaration itself, but forms part
of the official Conference proceedings.
Be that as it may, it is quite clear that sooner or
later developing countries will need to be ready to
enter into discussions or negotiations with advanced
countries with respect to competition policy at the
WTO as well as other multilateral, regional or bilat-
eral fora.4 International concern about the state of
competition and competition policy in emerging
countries precedes and goes beyond the Doha Dec-
laration. This is because these issues also derive their
international significance from some important
analyses of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998
and the subsequent proposals on the New Interna-
tional Financial Architecture. Competition and
competition policy figure prominently in these de-
signs for a new architecture for the global economic
system. This is due to the fact that international fi-
nancial institutions and orthodox economists suggest
that the “deeper causes” of the recent Asian crisis
were not the observed macroeconomic disequilibria
but rather structural, linked to the normal Asian way
of doing business. Apart from crony capitalism and
close relationships between firms, banks and gov-
ernments, such analyses single out for particular
attention the allegedly poor competitive environment
in the crisis-affected countries (Thailand, Indonesia
and the Republic of Korea). Further, in order to fore-
stall future crises, it is argued that emerging markets
need to be more open, transparent and “competi-
tive”.5
Nevertheless, it will be emphasized here that
apart from these international dimensions, competi-
tion and competition policy are also important for
developing countries in their own right. The present
paper builds on the author’s previous work in this
area (Singh and Dhumale, 1999; Singh 2001a, 2001b)
and extends it in a number of directions including
specifically the analysis of:
(i) the relationship between competition, compe-
tition policy and development at the national
level;
(ii) the important implications of the recent new
conceptual advances in the theory of industrial
organization for competition policy in devel-
oped and developing countries;
(iii) the impact of market power exercised by in-
dustrial country firms on developing countries,
including a more complete examination of the
effects of the current cross-border international
merger wave;
(iv) in addition, the paper puts forward a proposal
for establishing an international competition au-
thority to monitor anti-competitive behaviour
by large multinationals, and discusses the de-
sirability of such an authority, and what form it
should take to address the concerns and par-
ticular needs of developing countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II
will consider the current state of competition and
national competition policies in emerging markets
and examine the relationship between competition,
competition policy and economic development. Sec-
tion III argues that although developing countries
may not have needed competition policies in the past,
they do so now in the wake of liberalization and glo-
balization and the structural changes that these have
brought about both at the national level (privatiza-
tion and deregulation) and at the international level
(the gigantic international merger movement of the
1990s). Section IV will examine competition policy
in the United States, the European Community andCompetition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions 3
Japan in the light of new developments in economic
theory and draw implications for developing coun-
tries. Sections III and IV are concerned, by and large,
with national competition policies. Section V con-
siders the desirability or otherwise of multilateral
competition policy for developing countries. In that
context it also examines a proposal for an interna-
tional competition authority. Section VI concludes
by summing up the main message of the paper.
II. Competition and competition policy
A. Competition and competition policy in
emerging markets
1. The state of competition in emerging markets
What is the nature of competition in emerging
markets and how intensive is it? Strange as it may
seem, in the light of market-oriented reforms which
many developing countries have been implement-
ing over the last two decades, there are not many
empirical studies on this topic.
There are a bare handful of comparative inter-
national studies for developing countries which
provide data on variables such as three- or four-firm
concentration ratios. Even this information tends to
be somewhat dated. There also exist for a few coun-
tries more detailed studies usually in the standard
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm.
In the absence of hard evidence, it is not sur-
prising that there is considerable disagreement
amongst economists speculating about the degree of
competition in developing countries.
Laffont (1998) suggests that these countries
exhibit segmented product markets, discretionary
government regulations and considerable corruption
and hence are not very competitive. As noted ear-
lier, the advocates of the structuralist theory of the
Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 believe that the
crisis-affected Asian countries, including the Re-
public of Korea, suffered from poor competitive
environments that resulted in over-investment.
Michael Porter (1990), on the other hand, suggests
that the Republic of Korea chaebol (large conglom-
erates) display highly competitive behaviour, and in
the areas where the Republic of Korea has been in-
ternationally successful, these companies have been
subject to intense national and international compe-
tition.
Some apparent support for the lack of compe-
tition referred to above is provided by evidence on
how relatively difficult it is to start a new business
in emerging markets, due to complex government
regulations and bureaucracy.6 There are also con-
siderable barriers to exit in many developing
countries. Further, there is evidence that many de-
veloping countries favour large firms at the expense
of small firms in the provision of finance and other
measures.
Data in table 1 on concentration ratios lend
some support to the competition deficit thesis. The
table indicates that concentration ratios in develop-
ing countries have been quite high relative to
advanced countries. However, table 2, which reports
the share of small enterprises in total employment,
suggests the opposite, i.e. that there may be greater
competition in developing than in advanced coun-
tries. The differences between the United States and
the developing countries in table 2 are quite dramatic.
Whereas small enterprises (accounting for less than
10 workers) account for about 4 per cent of total
employment in the United States, in emerging coun-








Republic of Korea, 1981 62











United States, 1972 40
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The data in table 2 are subject to some important
statistical biases, all of which would, if anything,
understate the share of small firms in the economies
of developing countries.7 In more general terms, what
the data in tables 1 and 2 indicate is the dualistic
structure of developing country economies: a large
modern sector accounting for a big proportion of total
output exists side by side with a very large tradi-
tional sector of small enterprises which contribute
an almost equal proportion of the economy’s out-
put. Relative to advanced countries, the share of the
small-scale sector in developing countries in terms
of employment would be larger than in terms of out-
put because of the bigger differences in capital
intensity of the two sectors in these countries.
Thus, as far as the intensity of competition in
the two groups of countries is concerned, tables 1
and 2 provide conflicting information. Moreover,
these data bear only on the static measures of con-
centration which have acknowledged shortcomings
as indicators of the intensity of competition. To ob-
tain a more complete picture of the competition
process, it is necessary to supplement these static
measures by indicators of the dynamics of the com-
petition process. Fortunately there now exist some
studies on this subject, and it is also useful that they
employ different methodologies to model the dynam-
ics. First, there is research by Glen, Lee and Singh
(2001) which examines the persistency of profits in
seven emerging markets in the 1980s and the early
1990s. The authors use exactly the same methodol-
ogy as that employed by “persistence of profitability
studies” for advanced countries. The results of their
time series estimates of persistence coefficients in
emerging markets are reported in table 3. For pur-
poses of comparison, table 4 summarizes the results
of similar studies for advanced countries. Surpris-
ingly, the results indicate that developing countries
have consistently lower persistency coefficients than
those observed for advanced countries, indicating
that on the normal interpretation of such results, de-
veloping countries are subject to no less, if not greater
competition, than advanced countries. The possible
sources of bias in the empirical results for emerging
economies have been examined by Glen, Lee and
Singh (2002) and they find that these do not affect
their main conclusions.
Complementary evidence to that of Glen, Lee
and Singh is provided by another kind of research
which also bears on the dynamics of the competi-
tion process but uses a different methodology. This
research, which examines turnover, the entry and exit
of firms, provides extremely interesting results. Some
of the latter are summarized in table 5. The table
Table 2
DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT SHARES
FOR SMALL ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES
Number of workers
Country 1–4 5–9
United States, 1992 1.3 2.6
Mexico, 1993 13.8 4.5
Indonesia, 1986 44.2
Republic of Korea, 1973 7.9
Republic of Korea, 1988 12
Taiwan Prov. of China, 1986 20
India, 1971 42
Republic of Tanzania, 1967 56
Ghana, 1970 84
Kenya, 1969 49









Republic of Korea, 1975 40
Source: Tybout (2000); as well as for original sources for
each country.
Table 3
PERSISTENCE OF PROFITABILITY IN
EMERGING MARKETS
Mean λ Mean YLR Mean 22
Brazil 0.013 0.003 0.418
India 0.229 0.003 0.282
Jordan 0.348 0.050 0.299
Korea, Republic of 0.323 0.005 0.300
Malaysia 0.349 0.009 0.302
Mexico 0.222 -0.002 0.316
Zimbabwe 0.421 0.157 0.249
Source:  Glen, Lee and Singh (2001).Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions 5
Table 4
PERSISTENCE OF PROFITABILITY STUDIES FOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
Sample Observations Number Sample means
Author Country period per firm of firms  (lambda [i])
Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) United Kingdom 1947–1977 29 51 0.488
France 1965–1982 18 55 0.142
Germany 1961–1981 21 28 0.410
Schwalbach et al. (1989) Germany 1961–1982 22 299 0.485
Mueller (1990) United States 1950–1972 23 551 0.183
Cubbin and Geroski (1990) United Kingdom 1948–1977 30 243 0.482
Khemani and Shapiro (1990) Canada 1964–1982 19 129 0.425
Odagiri and Yamawaki (1990) Japan 1964–1982 19 376 0.465
Schohl (1990) Germany 1961–1981 21 283 0.509
Waring (1996) a United States 1970–1989 20 12,986 0.540
Source: Goddard and Wilson (1999).
a Estimate based on pooled data for 128 industry groups. The mean lambda has been estimated by the present authors from
the data in table 3 of Waring (1996).
Table 5
PLANT AND JOB TURNOVER IN DEVELOPING VERSUS DEVELOPED COUNTRIESa
Turnover rates Market shares of entrants
Minimum
Plants Jobs plant
<1 <5 <10 size
Country (period covered) 1 year 5 year 1 year 5 year year old year old year old  coveredb
Chile (1979–1986) 8.5 . 26.9 . 3.6 15.3 . 10
Colombia (1977–1989) 11.9 . 24.6 . 4.9 19.8 10
Morocco (1984–1990) 9.5 . 30.7 . 3.2 . . 10
Republic of Korea (1983–1993) . 64.2 . . . 32.5 . 5
Taiwan Prov. of China (1981–1991) . 67.9 . . . 43.9 63.2    1c
United States (1963–1982)  .  26.9d   18.9e 58.4   . 10.7d   18.6d 5
Canada (1973–1992)  . . 21.9 . . . . 5
Source: Tybout (2000), p. 26.
a Let Nt be the number of plants observed in year t; Et be the number of plants observed in year t but not t-1; and Xt  be the
number of plants observed in year t-1 but not in year t. Then the entry rate is Et/Nt-1 and the exit rate is Xt/Nt-1. The plant
turnover rate is the average of these two statistics. Similarly, the rate of gross job creation is the number of jobs at entering
plants plus the number of new jobs at expanding plants, divided by the initial number of jobs, and the gross job
destruction rate is the number of jobs that disappear as plants contract or exit divided by the initial number of jobs. The
sum of these two rates is the job turnover rate.
b Number of workers.
c  The data set from Taiwan Province of China describes firms rather than plants.
d Figures are average rates of new entry rates across 4-digit industries.
e These figures are for 1973–1992.G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 18 6
indicates that there is greater turnover as well as entry
and exit of firms in the small number of emerging
markets for which such studies have been carried
out than for advanced countries.
Apart from these two kinds of studies done on
the dynamics of the competition process, there are
also other types of evidence pertaining to the effi-
ciency of emerging market industries and to scale
economies which do not accord with the conven-
tional anecdotal account of the lack of competition
in emerging countries. This empirical research has
recently been reviewed by Tybout (2000, p. 38) who
sums up the situation as follows:
Indeed, although the issue remains open, the
existing empirical literature does not support
the notion that LDC manufacturers are rela-
tively stagnant and inefficient. Turnover rates
in plants and jobs are at least as high as those
found in the OECD, and the amount of cross-
plant dispersion in measured productivity rates
is not generally greater. Also, although small-
scale production is relatively common in
LDCs, there do not appear to be major poten-
tial gains from better exploitation of scale
economies.
2. The state of competition policy in developing
countries
Most developing countries have, until recently,
operated without a formal competition policy.8 As
table 6 suggests, until 1990 only 16 developing
countries had a formal competition policy. With
encouragement and technical assistance from inter-
national financial institutions and the WTO, 50 coun-
tries have completed legislation for competition laws
in the 1990s, and another 27 are in the process of
doing so. It should, however, be borne in mind that
it takes about 10 years for countries to acquire the
necessary expertise and experience to implement
such laws effectively (Scherer, 1994).
The main reason why developing countries did
not have a formal competition policy was that it was
not needed. This is because there was considerable
state control over economic activity and if the gov-
ernment thought there was anti-competitive behav-
iour by some corporations or industries, it intervened
directly and fixed prices such as for medicines and
other essential products. Besides, state-owned indus-
try was enjoined not to charge monopoly prices.
There is also evidence that competition laws
have varied widely in countries where they have been
introduced. Based on a survey of competition laws
in fifty countries, World Bank (2002) reports that
there are important inter-country differences in three
dimensions: (a) the definition of dominance; (b) the
treatment of cartels; and (c) enforcement. With re-
spect to the definition of market dominance, for
example, a majority of countries define it in qualita-
tive terms. However, 22 countries out of 50 define it
quantitatively, although with widely varying thresh-
olds, as seen in table 7. Similarly, the treatment of
cartels varies greatly in its severity. On the effective
implementation of competition laws, the World Com-
petitiveness Yearbook, 2000 estimates that based on
a survey of top- and middle-management of firms in
each country studied, competition authorities in ad-
Table 6
NUMBER OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THAT HAVE ADOPTED COMPETITION LAWS,
AS OF JUNE 2000
Pre- Under
Region 1950s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s preparation Total
Asia / Pacific 00222 1 4 6 2 6
Central / Eastern Europe 00001 1 6 1 1 8
Latin America and the Caribbean 121106 1 0 2 1
Africa 01012 1 4 1 0 2 8
Total 13345 5 0 2 7 9 3
Source: Calculation based on table V.1 of UNCTAD (2002), p. 151.Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions 7
vanced countries are 40 per cent more effective than
their counterparts in developing countries.9
B. Competition, competition policy and
economic development
1. Competition and competition policy
There would appear to be no obvious relation-
ship between competition policy and competition
since, as we have seen, many developing countries
have been able to maintain considerable competi-
tion in product markets despite the absence of a
formal competition policy. An analytical reason for
this lack of correspondence between competition and
competition policy lies in the fact that developing
country firms have been increasingly subject to for-
eign competition with the liberalization of their
economies. In the Asian NICs, even while they main-
tained selective import controls, their export-oriented
policies exposed firms to competition in foreign
markets. An additional reason was that governments
in these countries organized contest-based competi-
tions for state subsidies which were conditioned on
the achievement of certain performance standards
(export targets, foreign exchange earnings, and
technological upgrading are a few of the contest ob-
jectives utilized by governments), with the winners
receiving greater aid from the government.10
2. Competition and economic development
The relationship between competition and eco-
nomic development is controversial, both in
economic theory and in relation to empirical evi-
dence. Economic orthodoxy posits a monotonic
positive relationship between the two variables and
therefore suggests that the greater the intensity of
competition the better the economic performance.11
However, modern economic analysis seriously quali-
fies that conclusion. As Telser (1987) observed,
despite the reluctance of “many economists to ac-
cept the proposition that competition may be
excessive because the received theory regards com-
petition as always good, the more there is the better”,
new developments in the theory of industrial or-
ganization indicate that the excess competition
proposition is valid. These developments suggest that
maximum competition is not necessarily the opti-
mal degree of competition for promoting either
economic welfare in the static sense, or, more im-
portantly, in the dynamic sense, maximizing the
long-term trend-rate of growth of productivity in the
economy.12
In the real world, it is recognized that the case
for competition necessarily spurring economic effi-
ciency at the microeconomic level is very weak
because of the separation of management and con-
trol in large corporations, asymmetric information,
transactions costs and agency problems. Indeed,
Nickell (1996) suggests that the case for a positive
link between competition and increased effort by
economic agents is both theoretically tenuous and
has little empirical support.13 Nickell argues, there-
fore, that the virtues of competition are more
convincing at the broad-brush impressionistic level
rather than on the basis of rigorous econometric stud-
ies. He cites the broad, long-term experience of Japan
(good – due to a high level of competition) and that
of communist Eastern Europe (bad – because of lack
of competition) as the best confirmation of the posi-
tive relationship between competition and economic
development.
The seminal World Bank (1991) Report which
provided the intellectual basis for the Washington
Consensus contended on its first page that:
Competitive markets are the best way yet
found for efficiently organizing the produc-
tion and distribution of goods and services.
Domestic and external competition provides
the incentives that unleash entrepreneurship
and technological progress.
Table 7
BENCHMARKS OF PRODUCT MARKET




Country group  of the firm
Developing and transition countries
East Asia 50–75
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 30–40
Africa 20–45
Industrial countries
United States Two-thirds or more
European Union 40–50
Source: World Bank (2002), p. 140.G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 18 8
The Report’s basic analytical approach was to
suggest that the fastest growing countries were those
with the most rapid growth of total factor productiv-
ity (TFP). The latter in turn depended on domestic
and foreign competition achieved through free mar-
kets. The role of the state was, in this view, essentially
that of a “night watchman” concerned with providing
human capital and physical and social infrastructure
that provides a conducive environment in which
business can flourish. This may be a plausible model
in theory but in practice it did not describe the East
Asian experience at all accurately. However, as
World Bank (1993) itself acknowledged in its sub-
sequent report on the East Asian miracle, these
countries did not have maximum competition in
product, capital or labour markets, but rather strived
to achieve an optimal degree of co-operation and
competition. Thus, for example, Japan and the Re-
public of Korea implemented selective import
controls; fostered close relationships between gov-
ernment, business and finance; and discouraged
foreign investment while importing technology from
abroad by other means.14 The “broad-brush” East
Asian evidence, in short, does not bear out Nickell’s
claims for the virtues of competition in relation to
economic development. The experience of China,
which for the last two decades has had one of the
fastest growth rates in the world, is also consistent
with this East Asian story. The Chinese economy
has been able to register such fast growth rates de-
spite its segmented product markets and highly
imperfect capital and labour markets.
Nickell’s (1996) own study reports a positive
relationship between competition and long-run pro-
ductivity growth for firms in the United Kingdom.
He notes, however, that in general empirical evidence
for the claim that competition enhances corporate
performance is not overwhelming. Detailed micro-
economic research also indicates that there is no
monotonic relationship between competition (as
proxied by the number of firms) and managerial ef-
fort or other benefits of competition. On the basis of
game-theoretical models as well as empirical stud-
ies, World Bank (2002, p. 134) notes that it is possible
to attain the benefits of competition – greater effi-
ciency and innovation in product markets – with
“some” degree of competition, but competition by a
large number of firms is not always required.
Another useful piece of evidence comes from
an interesting recent study by Aw, Chung and Roberts
(2002) that systematically compares turnover and
exit and entry rates for the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan Province of China firms in seven compara-
ble industries in the late 1980s. The results indicate
that, on all the dynamic measures of competition
examined by the authors, Taiwan Province of China
was more competitive than the Republic of Korea.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the overall trend
rates of growth in the two economies have been very
similar in the period examined as well as over a
longer period.
To sum up, the main point that emerges from
the above discussion of the relationship between
competition and economic development is that a
suitable combination of co-operation and competi-
tion is more likely to enhance societal welfare than
competition alone. This conclusion is supported not
only by the experience of the East Asia countries
and China, but also by that of industrial districts in
Italy and in many other countries.15 Further, recent
theoretical developments suggest that, in relation to
innovation, “inter-firm co-ordination even among
horizontal competitors can bring substantial welfare
benefits.” (Baumol, 2001 p. 736).
III. Competition policy, liberalization
and globalization
A. Competition policy, privatization and
deregulation
Notwithstanding developing countries’ lack of
experience with competition policies, and the gen-
eral scepticism about whether maximum or perfect
competition is optimal for long-term productivity
growth, there are good reasons to suggest that, un-
der the present global economic arrangements, it is
important for developing countries to establish for-
mal competition policies. This is primarily because
enormous structural changes which have occurred
in developing country economies during the last two
decades as a result of privatization and deregulation.
These have been spawned by technological, eco-
nomic, political and ideological forces which are
leading to liberalization as well as greater integra-
tion of the world economy. As many of the privatized
firms include natural monopolies, it is important that
an appropriate regulatory and competition policy
framework be in place to ensure improved economic
performance. In relation to the question of perfect
versus optimum degree of competition, it will be
appreciated that nuanced competition laws will be
required to implement optimal competition.Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions 9
A significant danger is that privatization may
simply lead to a substitution of public sector mo-
nopolies by private monopolies, which would
arguably reduce social welfare, as unlike in the case
of the public sector, the private sector is usually un-
der no formal injunction to advance people’s well
being. In addition, the experience of privatization in
the United Kingdom and many other countries sug-
gests that it is not ownership itself which affects
performance, but rather the external environment,
particularly as regards to competition which is the
more important factor.16 Hence, the need for an ap-
propriate competition policy.
B. The international merger wave and
competition policy in developing
countries
Another extremely important reason for devel-
oping countries to have competition laws today
derives from the huge international cross-border
merger movement which has been re-shaping the
world economy during the last decade. UNCTAD
(2000, 2001) data shows that the global value
of cross-border acquisitions has risen from about
0.5 per cent of world GDP in the mid-1980s to well
over 2 per cent in 2000. As these international merg-
ers, as well as those between large corporations
within the developed countries themselves, are quite
central to the policy proposals which will be put for-
ward later, it is important to carefully review the
stylized facts and what the vast literature on merg-
ers has taught us about these phenomena.
1. The 1990s global merger wave in historical
perspective
The first stylized fact about mergers is that these
normally come in waves. Second, analyses suggest
that each wave generally has the stamp of special
factors; these normally lead to differing perceptions
concerning asset values among economic agents
which in turn encourages mergers (Gort, 1969).
Among the largest recorded waves in the United
States is that between about 1890 and 1905.17 This
wave – dominated by “mergers for monopoly” – saw
the creation of giant United States firms which sub-
sequently dominated the industrial landscape for
much of the 20th century. Ironically, it is thought that
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, by outlawing
co-operation between firms, thereby encouraged
mergers.18 The 1920s wave was labelled by Stigler
as “mergers for oligopoly”. The wave of the 1960s
was characterized by conglomerate mergers and that
of the 1980s by the “bust-up” of the same conglom-
erate mergers and by leveraged buy-outs.
The 1990s merger movement, in contrast, has
witnessed “size-increasing blow-up mergers” creat-
ing very large global players. This wave had its origin
in new technology, globalization and deregulation,
factors which not surprisingly lead to dramatic dis-
turbances in economic agents’ perceptions of market
valuations of firms, fuelling mergers. Many of these
mergers are defensive in that, once one large player
takes over another company, other players are
obliged to follow suit, through defensive takeovers,
in order to maintain their market share. Holmstrom
and Kaplan (2001) argue that a distinguishing feature
of the 1990s merger wave in the United States were
enormous changes in corporate governance. In their
view, during the 1980s the capital market exercised
an increasing influence on corporate performance
through leveraged buy-outs and other hostile tender
offers for firms. However, by the 1990s managers
appear to have internalized the virtues of maximiz-
ing shareholder value as their main motivation, not
least because they themselves benefited through
stock options. In brief, the work of leading scholars
in this area suggests that the 1990s takeover wave in
the United States and in the world economy has been
motivated by firms trying to achieve domination and
bigger size in a global market. This has been effected
by offensive takeovers in the market for corporate
control, even though their intent in terms of product
market competition may have been defensive, e.g.
maintaining market share in the face of takeovers
by competing firms.
The United States merger wave of 1990s ap-
pears to come to an end with the deflation of
technology bubble on the stock market in the first
half of 2000. However, once the stock market re-
vives, there continue to exist a number of factors
which would propel another merger movement. In
previous merger waves most mergers were national,
that is, within national boundaries. This was particu-
larly striking in the merger wave of the 1960s which
took place simultaneously in most leading industrial
economies. However, despite these waves occurring
at the same time in many countries, there were sur-
prisingly few cross-border takeovers (Singh, 1992).
In that sense, the 1990s merger wave, with a huge
component of cross-border takeovers, has been quite
unique.
It is also important to note that most cross-
border mergers take place among industrial countriesG-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 18 10
themselves. They are closely linked with foreign
direct investment (FDI). Indeed, most of the FDI
among advanced countries nowadays occurs through
this channel. However, the incidence of cross-border
takeovers via FDI is much lower in developing than
in advanced countries. The overall estimate of the
size of cross-border takeovers in developing coun-
tries (table 8) is somewhat misleading as it is heavily
influenced by China. The latter is the largest devel-
oping country recipient of FDI, but it generally
permits only greenfield FDI. If China is excluded,
cross-border takeovers constitute a far larger and
growing part of FDI in other developing economies
(UNCTAD, 1999).
2. Benefits and costs of mergers
What are likely to be the benefits and costs of
the 1990s merger wave to different groups of coun-
tries and to the global economy? In theory, takeovers
can increase societal welfare through two separate
channels. The first is the threat of takeovers, which
may oblige inefficient firms to become more effi-
cient; the second is through the takeovers themselves
which may lead to synergies between the activities
of the acquired and acquiring firms. An obvious so-
cial cost of the second channel is the potential
monopoly power of the merged firms.
It is significant that, although takeovers and
mergers are central to the theory of the firm, to in-
dustrial organization, privatization and deregulation
amongst other fields of study, there is no unified
theory of mergers as such (see further Singh, 1992).
However, issues concerning the costs and benefits
of mergers have been explored in a vast literature
comprising both analytical and empirical studies.19
In order to give coherence to the empirical studies,
I shall briefly review the work on the nature of the
takeover selection mechanism on the stock market,
this includes, inter alia, the question above concern-
ing the extent to which the threat of takeovers is
effective in improving economic performance of in-
Table 8
CROSS-BORDER M&As:a SALES AND PURCHASES, 1998–1999
(US$ billions)
Sales Purchases
Region/economy 1998 1999 1998 1999
Developed countries 445.1 644.6 511.4 677.3
European Union 187.9 344.5 284.4 497.7
United States 209.5 233.0 137.4 112.4
Japan 4.0 15.9 1.3 9.8
Developing countries 80.7 63.4 19.2 41.2
Africa 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 63.9 37.2 12.6 24.9
Europe . 0.3 . .
Asia 16.1 25.3 6.4 15.9
Pacific . 0.1 . .
Central and Eastern Europeb 5.1 10.3 1.0 1.6
Worldc 531.6 720.1 531.6 720.1
Source: UNCTAD (2000).
a Cross-border M&As that result in the acquisition of more than 10 per cent equity share.
b Includes the countries of the former Yugoslavia.
c Includes amounts which cannot be allocated by region.Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions 11
efficient firms (measured by profitability). Singh
(1971, 1975), which were among the first studies on
this subject, investigated this by comparing the
multivariate characteristics of (a) acquired and non-
acquired firms; (b) acquiring and acquired firms; and
(c) acquiring and non-acquiring firms. Briefly,
Singh’s main result was that selection in the market
for corporate control does not occur solely on the
basis of performance (e.g. profitability or stock mar-
ket valuation); it also occurs on the basis of size
which is the more important discriminator. Thus, a
large unprofitable firm has a better chance of sur-
vival than a small, relatively more profitable firm.
These results on the empirical characterization of
the selection mechanism have been confirmed in
many subsequent studies (see table 9 which summa-
rizes a wide range of studies from different countries
on this and other points related to takeovers).
The effects of mergers have been studied by
industrial organization economists in terms of prof-
itability and by financial economists in terms of stock
market valuation. Most studies by industrial or-
ganization economists invariably find reduced
profitability after mergers, or, at the best, no change,
after controlling for all the relevant factors.20 Finan-
cial economists, on the other hand, believe that
mergers increase the stock market value of the com-
bined firms. This valuation undoubtedly increases
during a short period of a few weeks preceding the
takeover event. At that time, the acquired firm’s value
increases by an average of 20–30 per cent; the ac-
quiring firm’s value remains more or less the same.
The combined result is greater value. However, the
acquiring firm’s shareholders suffer systematic losses
which begin as soon as six months after the takeo-
ver and which may go on for a number of years.
On the question of whether mergers lead to
concentration or monopoly power, there is a large
and controversial literature. On one side are econo-
mists who believe that with liberalization of trade
throughout the world the size of the relevant market
has enormously increased and therefore the mo-
Table 9
MERGER STUDIES RESULTS: A SUMMARY
Characteristics Bidder Target
Size >industry, > target < industry, < bidder
Profitability > industry, > target > industry, < bidder
Growth > industry, > target < industry, < bidder
Market-to-book ratio < industry ?
Effects of the acquisition
Return on share announcement about equal to long-run losses premium 20–50 per cent
Profits down
Sales down







Relatedness related business > horizontal > vertical> conglomerate
Size difference big difference > equal size
Motive tender offer > merger; hostile ? friendly ?
Market-to-book ratio value bidders > glamour bidders
Financing cash > stock
Source: Tichy (2001).G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 18 12
nopoly power effects of mergers are no longer sig-
nificant. This view is strongly contested by others.
Tichy (2001), in his comprehensive survey of the
merger literature, notes that:
Contrary to widely held opinion, concentra-
tion is a quickly increasing problem, even with
the extension of markets resulting from the new
policy of the big corporations. Driven by the
superficial advice of their consultants they
strive hard to belong to the top three in their
respective market, and sometimes they con-
centrate forcefully on narrowly limited mar-
kets to achieve this goal. If they are success-
ful, a great number of oligopolistic markets
with very few competitors result, strongly sup-
porting collusion. (Tichy, 2001, p. 20)
He concludes by observing that the “goal of
being among the three leading players in the world
market creates oligopolistic power if the competi-
tive fringe is not extremely strong, as the likelihood
of strong competition with fewer than four to five
competitors is rather small.”
It will be useful at this point to review a recent
massive study of the effects of mergers carried out
by Gugler et al. (2001). They examined mergers of
the decades of the 1980s and the 1990s in a large
number of countries in all parts of the world, where
the relevant data is available. Defining merger as a
transaction where more than 50 per cent of the eq-
uity of the “victim” firm is acquired, their data
suggests that between 1981 and 1998 there were
nearly 70,000 merger announcements, of these
45,000 were actually completed, nearly half of them
in the United States (see table 10). The results of
their study of the effects of these mergers on profits,
sales and market value and their overall findings are
reported in table 11. These results are broadly con-
sistent with those of much of the merger literature.
The effects of mergers on profitability are positive
but insignificant, until the fifth year after merger
when the positive effect is significant only at the 10
per cent level. The impact on sales and market value
are strongly negative and statistically significant
from the merger year onwards.
In terms of the methodology presented by
Gugler et al., mergers which enhance the efficiency
of the merging firms should demonstrate an increase
in both their profits and their sales. An efficiency-
reducing merger would have a negative effect both
on sales and on profits. A merger which increases
market power would increase profits and reduce
sales. Overall, the authors’ results indicate that no
more than a quarter of the mergers appear to increase
efficiency, and a quarter increase profits by increas-
ing the market power of the firms involved. About
50 per cent of the mergers fail, paying for increased
sales by reduced profits or losing sales as well as
profits. The authors of this study were also able to
compare the effects of cross-border mergers with
those of domestic ones. The results suggest broadly
similar effects.
The above analysis of the effects of mergers
has taken a rather narrow, economic efficiency view
of their benefits and costs. A more comprehensive
analysis must also include a discussion of the distri-
butional consequences of mergers as these often tend
to be quite large. The benefits of mergers may, for
example, go to shareholders whilst the costs may be
borne by workers who lose their jobs as a result of
rationalization. Although the importance of these
distributional issues is recognized (see for example
Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Singh, 1993), there is
very little empirical literature on the subject. In the
context of the present paper the issue of the distri-
bution of the gains and costs of mergers between
countries is also pertinent.
3. The international merger movement and
developing countries
The foregoing examination of the causes and
effects of the current international merger movement
raises important concerns for developing countries.
First, there are the obvious questions of increased
market power of large multinationals and their po-
tential abuse of dominance. Developing countries
are clearly affected directly by the monopoly power
effects of international mergers when a foreign mul-
tinational acquires a domestic firm. However, they
are also affected indirectly even when mergers take
place outside their jurisdictions, e.g. within advanced
countries themselves. The “rule of being in the top
three”, as Tichy argues, reduces the contestability
of markets and is especially harmful to the interests
of late industrialising countries whose firms are
building up their capabilities to compete in interna-
tional markets. The reduced contestability of markets
is therefore of special concern for developing coun-
tries.
Developing countries clearly need a competi-
tion policy in order to be able to deal with these issues
of market dominance and abuse of dominant posi-
tions. However, even with such legislation on the
statute books these countries may not have the powerCompetition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions 13
Table 10
CROSS-BORDER DEALS, HORIZONTAL AND CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
BY COUNTRY GROUPINGS
(Percentage unless otherwise indicated)
Until 1990 1991/92 1993/94 1995/96 1997/98 Total
United States
Number of deals 8194 1965 2840 3783 4369 21151
Value of deals (US$ million) 242.44 104.45 139.33 195.70 313.94 221.19
Cross-border deals 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.11
Horizontal mergers 0.38 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.44
Conglomerate mergers 0.56 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.51
United Kingdom
Number of deals 1180 501 790 1138 1148 4757
Value of deals (US$ million) 220.07 113.82 61.11 97.31 158.92 139.32
Cross-border deals 0.35 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.32
Horizontal mergers 0.31 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.36 0.35
Conglomerate mergers 0.64 0.59 0.62 0.58 0.61 0.61
Western Europe
Number of deals 986 2125 1996 2364 2059 9530
Value of deals (US$ million) 398.95 188.63 163.41 144.44 320.33 241.90
Cross-border deals 0.54 0.24 0.27 0.33 0.48 0.35
Horizontal mergers 0.37 0.44 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.38
Conglomerate mergers 0.59 0.53 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.59
Japan
Number of deals 172 88 61 151 168 640
Value of deals (US$ million) 528.91 474.11 198.55 754.97 177.43 478.73
Cross-border deals 0.81 0.72 0.59 0.34 0.45 0.57
Horizontal mergers 0.33 0.30 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.34
Conglomerate mergers 0.62 0.70 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.63
Australia, New Zealand, Canada
Number of deals 671 425 549 767 875 3287
Value of deals (US$ million) 357.63 69.55 61.56 126.97 109.70 150.54
Cross-border deals 0.38 0.23 0.32 0.28 0.36 0.32
Horizontal mergers 0.44 0.43 0.48 0.40 0.39 0.42
Conglomerate mergers 0.52 0.55 0.49 0.57 0.58 0.54
Rest of world
Number of deals 371 553 831 1731 1733 5219
Value of deals (US$ million) 278.88 150.74 88.64 112.76 142.92 132.60
Cross-border deals 0.50 0.26 0.33 0.25 0.35 0.31
Horizontal mergers 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.36
Conglomerate mergers 0.59 0.59 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.60
Total
Number of deals 11574 5657 7067 9934 10352 44584
Value of deals (US$ million) 260.63 131.11 116.51 162.70 243.09 199.71
Cross-border deals 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.30 0.23
Horizontal mergers 0.37 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41
Conglomerate mergers 0.57 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.55
Source: Gugler et al., p. 27.G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 18 14
to restrain cartels and other uncompetitive conduct
by large multinationals, owing to inadequate devel-
opment of the legal and institutional framework, lack
of information and difficulties of proving that prices
an being manipulated by international cartels. It has
become conventional to underplay the practical sig-
nificance of cartels presumably on the ground that
these arrangements tend to be short lived and their
incidence is quite low. However, the United States
anti-trust authorities, which have long held a strong
anti-cartel position, made their stance even stronger
in the early 1990s. By the end of the decade the
United States position was accepted by European
Union and other advanced countries. Consequently,
several industrial countries have passed legislation
to stiffen the penalties for participation in illegal
cartels. It is also increasingly recognized that the il-
legal cartels that are actually detected and prosecuted
are merely the tip of a large iceberg.21 Recently, the
United States government fined participants in a
European vitamin’s cartel a record sum of $750 mil-
lion. If such cartels can operate in an economy like
that of the Unite States, with its long history of anti-
trust laws and their enforcement, it is more than likely
that their incidence will be quiet high in developing
countries.
The experience of the 1930s with widespread
cartelization in peripheral countries points in the
same direction. During that decade, it is estimated
that very roughly 30 to 50 per cent of the world’s
exports were subject to cartel manipulation of prices.
The post-World War II reduction in the incidence of
cartelization may mainly be attributed to two fac-
tors: (a) stricter enforcement of laws against cartels
in advanced countries, particularly the United States;
(b) the replacement of cartels by straight forward
mergers between firms.22 However, more recently,
the European Union Competition Commission has
begun to vigorously prosecute cartel arrangements
in many different industries, so as to ensure that a
single European market is not thwarted by carteliza-
tion and division of markets.23 The latter was wide
spread in the 1930s in the so-called sphere of influ-
ence cartelization. The latter often took the form of
European companies, for example, withdrawing
from competition with the United States firms in
Latin American countries as these lay in the Ameri-
can sphere of influence. In return, the United States
corporations would undertake not to compete with
Europeans in Southern and Eastern Europe, recog-
nizing these countries to be in the European sphere
of influence.
It is important to note that the anti-cartel legis-
lation in advanced countries does not normally
extend to developing countries. Indeed, on the con-
trary, exports or foreign markets are often explicitly
exempted from such laws. In these circumstances,
in addition to domestic competition policies, devel-
oping countries clearly require considerable
co-operation from advanced countries to be able to
cope at all effectively with anti-competitive behav-
iour of advanced country cartels between the large
multinationals. From the perspective of poor coun-
tries, it is therefore necessary not only to have the
Table 11
EFFECTS OF MERGERS FOR FULL SAMPLE
Years Profitability Sales Market value
after
the Differ- Differ- Differ-
merger ence a p-value Obs. Pos. ence a p-value Obs. Pos. ence a p-value Obs. Pos.
0 .... . ... 50.512 0.000 6211 0.524
1 1.884 0.580 2603 0.554 73.654 0.008 2603 0.688 -49.262 0.035 5282 0.472
2 3.864 0.413 2171 0.556 -87.435 0.025 2171 0.652 -177.464 0.000 4189 0.437
3 5.081 0.395 1810 0.536 -193.993 0.000 1810 0.621 -342.415 0.000 3416 0.401
4 11.660 0.119 1474 0.566 -189.038 0.008 1474 0.610 -528.251 0.000 2784 0.375
5 15.989 0.097 1210 0.565 -263.392 0.004 1210 0.588 -865.520 0.000 2218 0.357
Source: Gugler et al., p. 29.
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right kind of domestic competition policies, but also
an appropriate framework for international co-op-
eration on competition issues.
IV.  Competition policy and developing
countries: taking account of the
developmental dimension
What kind of competition policy would be suit-
able for developing countries? In the light of the
previous discussion, such a policy must at least be
able to (a) restrain anti-competitive behaviour by
domestic privatized large firms; (b) limit abuses of
monopoly power by mega-corporations created by
the international merger movement; and (c) promote
development.
The question of what constitutes an appropri-
ate competition policy for late industrializing
economies will be examined here on the basis of
economic theory and the historical experience of the
developed countries – the European Union countries,
the United States and Japan.
A. Competition policy and development:
analytical considerations
Important guidance for competition policy is
offered by the economic theory of the “second best”.
Laffont puts forward the basic argument on the sec-
ond best in the following terms:
Competition is an unambiguously good thing
in the first-best world of economists. That
world assumes large numbers of participants
in all markets, no public goods, no externali-
ties, no information asymmetries, no natural
monopolies, complete markets, fully rational
economic agents, a benevolent court system
to enforce contracts, and a benevolent gov-
ernment providing lump sum transfers to
achieve any desirable redistribution. Because
developing countries are so far from this ideal
world, it is not always the case that competi-
tion should be encouraged in these countries.
(Laffont, 1998, p. 237)
The basic idea is, of course, that, if some of the
conditions for a competitive equilibrium are violated,
a second-best solution would involve restrictions on
competition. Precisely what those restrictions should
be is a much more difficult question, because that
depends on the nature and structure of the existing
distortions and whether these can be remedied
through other means. Laffont is quite pessimistic
about developing countries being able to implement
competition laws because of widespread rent-seek-
ing, corruption and ineffective governments in these
countries. He makes a valid point that implementa-
tion of competition law requires a strong state which
many developing countries lack.
Pessimism is not, however, warranted in the case
of all developing countries. Many semi-industrial
countries have strong and effective governments,
though not always fully democratic. These include
some of the most populous countries in the develop-
ing world, such as China, India, Brazil and Mexico.
There are also several well-known developmental
states. Moreover, the question of corruption should
be kept in perspective. Many of the East Asian coun-
tries, including China, do not rank very high in the
transparency league table, and yet, these are the coun-
tries with the fastest rates of sustained growth in the
history of humankind. Indonesia, for example, has
become a byword for corruption during Suharto’s
regime, yet during his thirty-year rule the country’s
record was the best in the world in reducing poverty
(Stiglitz, 1998).24 In the Republic of Korea, the two
presidents who presided over that country’s rapid
industrial expansion in the late 1970s and 1980s were
each convicted by courts for accepting hundreds of
millions of United States dollars in bribes. Even in
relation to developed countries, the post-World War
II Italian economic miracle does not seem to have
been hampered by widespread cronyism and corrup-
tion within the political establishment. There is
clearly no simple relationship between corruption,
economic growth and a country’s ability to imple-
ment interventionist economic and industrial policy
including competition policy.
What kind of competition policy would be
appropriate for those developing countries with
reasonably effective states as well as the necessary
institutional framework to carry out a developmen-
tal program? The central point here is that the
second-best framework outlined above is much too
narrow for taking into account the developmental
dimension. This is in part because for a developing
country the purpose of competition policy cannot
simply be the promotion of competition as a good
thing per se, but to foster economic development.
This would in some instances involve restriction of
competition and in others its vigorous promotion. In
order to raise the living standards of their people
over time, developing countries need high rates ofG-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 18 16
investment to achieve fast growth of productivity.
High rates of investment in turn normally require
reasonable, if not high, rates of profits in order to
maintain the private sector’s propensity to invest.
This consideration leads to the view that there that
there may at times be too much competition rather
than too little. Competition would be too much if it
leads to price wars, sharp falls in profits, all of which
are likely to diminish the corporate desire to invest.
In the real world of incomplete and missing markets
which is particularly the case in developing coun-
tries, the latter may also require government
co-ordination of investment decisions to prevent
over-capacity. A developing country cannot there-
fore afford to have maximum competition, rather it
must operate with an optimal degree of competition
or with an appropriate blend of competition and co-
operation to achieve its long term goals of faster and
sustained economic growth. As was noted earlier in
the discussion in Section III, this is also the conclu-
sion that emerges from new developments in the
theory of industrial organization.
To sum up, the above analysis suggests that
competition policy cannot be a unique, one-size-fits-
all, policy which is appropriate for all developing
countries. The optimal policy will differ between
countries depending on their stage of development
and the effectiveness of their governments as well
as the supporting institutional framework.
B. Competition policies in advanced
countries
It may be useful to consider briefly what the
nature and practice of competition policy has been
in developed countries. What lessons can develop-
ing countries draw from their experience?
1.  United States
The United States is the country with the long-
est history of anti-trust laws and laws prohibiting
restraints on competition. In the period from the end
of World War II to the 1980s, with respect to the
former, the United States followed a structural policy
which more or less forbade mergers in the same in-
dustry. This is thought by some to have encouraged
the conglomerate mergers of the 1960s. With the lib-
eralization of the world economy and the United
States’ difficulties in maintaining equilibrium in its
current account, there appears to have been a relaxa-
tion of the strict interpretation of the competition
laws. It is a moot point whether this was due more
to the influence of foreign competition or to that of
the Chicago School, but the upshot was that the en-
forcement of competition laws became relatively
relaxed. For example, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion began to take account of economies of scale as
a defence against charges of increased market power.
More recently, there have been further relaxations
of anti-trust laws in the light of advances in eco-
nomic theory and the courts’ acceptance of these. In
a recent review, Baker (1999) concluded as follows:
Three decades ago, antitrust law relied heav-
ily upon “per se” rules, which took the broad-
brush approach of deeming certain classes of
business practices anticompetitive without re-
gard to their effects in any particular case.
Today, a case-by-case analysis is more com-
mon, often under the judicial rubric of apply-
ing the “rule of reason”. (Baker, 1999, p. 191)
The per se rules which prevailed for a long time
in the United States conception and implementation
of anti-trust law reflected the belief that competi-
tion is a good thing per se, without regard to its
economic consequences. This is the doctrine that is
now changing.
2.  European Union
The European Union’s competition law con-
sists of Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome and
the national competition laws of the member states.
The primary objective of these laws is the creation
of the single European market. However, European
competition law also makes provision for industrial
policy under strict guidelines as well as provision
for other objectives such as fairness, equality of in-
come distribution and other social goals (e.g.
reducing regional disparities and unemployment).
Audretsch, Baumol and Burke (2001) note two
shortcomings in European Union competition law
from the perspective of dynamic efficiency: the lack
of clarity on the social welfare objective of the laws
and an emphasis on static efficiency. They argue that
the economic prescription for competition policy is
relatively simple only if one ignores such phenom-
ena as (a) the variation in the abilities of firms to
exploit particular profit opportunities; (b) the evo-
lution of such capability with the passage of time;
or (c) the manipulation of barriers to entry or the
incentives for innovation and its possible abuse as a
means to undermine competition. (Audretsch et al.
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3. Japan
Competition policy in Japan has evolved over
time since its inception under the United States mili-
tary occupation in the late 1940s. The period which
is relevant for developing countries is that from
1950–1973 when Japan was much more like a newly-
industrializing country than it is today. During this
period Japan achieved extraordinarily fast economic
growth, with manufacturing production rising at over
13 per cent per annum, GDP at 10 per cent a year
and its share of world exports rising by a huge ten
percentage points.
At this time, Japanese industrial policy, formu-
lated by the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), had much the upper hand over the
Fair Trade Commission (FTC), the competition
watchdog. One of MITI’s main objectives was to
ensure a high rate of profitability and investment in
Japanese industry. MITI was therefore always con-
cerned with questions of “ruinous competition”
leading to reduced profits and a lower propensity to
invest. The Ministry thus officially sponsored a wide
variety of cartels (including recession cartels, ex-
port cartels and technology cartels, to name a few),
sequenced investment by firms and intervened in the
exit and entry decisions of firms, all of which con-
tributed to the high concentration ratios observed in
the Japanese economy (see tables 1 and 12).
Some scholars, such as Caves and Uekusa
(1976), have been stringent in their criticism of this
weak competition policy arguing that it has imposed
serious allocational inefficiencies on the Japanese
economy.
However, MITI did not just thwart the FTC’s
codes and objectives, but it also implemented an in-
dustrial policy that encouraged contest-based
competition between oligopolistic firms where the
rewards were access to cheap credit and foreign ex-
change as well as, where necessary, protection from
international competition. These rewards were con-
tingent on relative performance either in export
markets, technological development, or in introduc-
ing new products. The result was, as Odagiri (1994)
and Porter (1990) note, that rivalry between firms in
Table 12
JAPANESE CARTEL AGREEMENTS EXEMPTED FROM THE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW
BY THE FAIR TRADE COMMISSION OR THE COMPETENT MINISTRY
BY EXEMPTING STATUTE, 1964–1973a
Statutory basis for exemption 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Depression cartels 2 2 16 1 0 0 0 0 9 2
Rationalization cartels 14 14 14 13 13 12 10 13 10 10
Export cartels 201 208 211 206 213 217 214 192 175 180
Import cartels 1 2 3 4 3 4 4 3 2 2
Cartels under Medium and Small
Enterprises Organization Act 588 587 652 634 582 522 469 439 604 607
Cartels under Environment
Sanitation Act 106 122 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123
Cartels under Coastal Shipping
 Association Act 15 14 16 15 22 22 22 21 19 19
Cartels under other statutes 43 50 44 44 47 48 56 53 34 42
Total 970 999 1079 1040 1003 948 898 844 976 985
Source: Japanese Fair Trade Commission, Staff Office, The Antimonopoly Act of Japan (1973, p. 27). Reproduced from Caves
and Uekusa (1976). Industrial Organization in Japan, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
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Japan was extremely intense. Indeed, as the persist-
ency of profitability studies of the kind reviewed in
Section II indicate, the intensity of competition in
Japan’s manufacturing sector has been greater than
in United States manufacturing (Odagiri, 1994).
Thus, Japan followed a policy that promoted
dynamic efficiency (in the sense of maximizing long-
term growth of productivity) through an institutional
structure that combined both co-operation and com-
petition between firms. This policy has much to
commend it to developing countries. It is fully in
accord with the analytical considerations for an
appropriate competition policy for developing coun-
tries outlined earlier and is also consistent with the
latest advances in economic theory.25
C. New concepts for competition policy for
economic development
In Singh and Dhumale (1999) we expressed
serious misgivings about the WTO Working Group’s
analysis of competition policy for developing coun-
tries. It did not seem to us to meet one of the Group’s
chief objectives: to take the development dimension
of competition policy fully into account. We came
to the view that a discussion on competition policy
and economic development in terms of the WTO
concepts such as market access, reciprocity and na-
tional treatment was prejudicial to the interests of
developing countries. To take the development di-
mension properly into account, it was essential to
have new definitions and fresh concepts rather than
to conduct the exercise in terms of the WTO termi-
nology.
On the basis of the modern theory of industrial
organization, as well as the history of competition
policy in developed countries, Singh and Dhumale
suggested that development-friendly competition
policies need to have different objectives from those
normally posited for advanced economies. Further,
such policies also need to be specific to the stage of
a country’s economic and industrial development as
well as its institutional and governance capacities.
In relation to the WTO Working Group’s tasks, this
analysis suggested the following concepts to address
the developmental dimensions of competition policy:
• the need to emphasise dynamic rather than static
efficiency as the main purpose of competition
policy from the perspective of economic de-
velopment;
• the concept of “optimal degree of competition”
(as opposed to maximum or perfect competi-
tion) to promote long term growth of produc-
tivity;
• the related concept of “optimal combination of
competition and co-operation” to achieve fast
long term economic growth;
• the critical significance of maintaining the pri-
vate sector’s propensity to invest at high levels
and hence the need for a steady growth of prof-
its; the latter in turn may necessitate govern-
ment co-ordination of investment decisions so
as to prevent over-capacity and falling profits;
• the concept of simulated competition, i.e., con-
tests, for state support which can be as power-
ful as real market competition;
• the crucial importance of industrial policy to
achieve the structural changes required for eco-
nomic development; this in turn requires co-
herence between industrial and competition
policies.
The development dimension is thus far from
being fully taken into account by suggestions that
all that developing countries need is a longer time
frame to be able to implement the United States or
United Kingdom type of competition policy. The
special and different circumstances of developing
countries and their developmental needs require a
creative application of the concepts above to com-
petition policy questions.
V. Multilateral competition policy
versus international competition
authority
At the WTO a number of advanced countries
have been pressing developing countries to negoti-
ate to make competition policy subject to that
organization’s multilateral disciplines, so as to en-
sure “fair play” and “level playing fields” between
countries.
Developing countries have been opposed to
such proposals. Their formal stance has been to sug-
gest that as many of them have no experience of
competition policy, they are not in a position to be
able to enter into negotiations on these matters. The
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that they do not wish any new disciplines to be in-
cluded in the WTO agreements because of the
provision of cross-sanctions: a violation in one area
may be penalized in another by the complaining
country (if the complaint is held to be justified). Until
the Doha meeting developing countries took the view
that the Uruguay Round Agreements, that established
the WTO, needed to be properly reviewed for their
impact on economic development before undertaking
a new round of tariff cutting or starting negotiations
on new subjects such as competition policy and the
multilateral agreement on investment. However, after
the Doha Ministerial meeting developing countries
may find it difficult to maintain such a stance for
long.
It may be interesting to observe that there has
been an ironic reversal of roles here. In the past,
developing countries were in favour of multilateral
action to restrict business practices of the large mul-
tinational companies. At the insistence of developing
countries the United Nations General Assembly in
December 1980 adopted, by Resolution 35/63 a “Set
of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and
Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Prac-
tices”. The “Set” is fairly comprehensive in scope
and covers a wide range of restrictive business prac-
tices by multinationals, including the abuse of their
dominant positions whether achieved through merg-
ers and acquisitions or joint ventures.26 At that time
developing countries were in favour of making SET
legally binding. This, however, was not acceptable
to developed countries. Today the position is the
other way around with advanced countries seeking
a binding multilateral agreement through the WTO
and developing countries opposing it.
Proponents of a multilateral agreement on com-
petition policy have put forward the following
arguments in its favour:
• It would be helpful to developing countries as
it would enable them to restrain anti-competi-
tive behaviour and cartelization by large, ad-
vanced country corporations.
• It may help to bring the TRIPS agreement under
multilateral competition disciplines. Maskus
and Lahouel (2000) suggest that the possible
abuse of intellectual property rights, as well as
parallel imports, could be regulated by a multi-
laterally agreed competition policy.
• Stiglitz (1999) suggests that if there were a new
multilateral competition policy agreement this
would help to blunt the potency of anti-dump-
ing laws by bringing them into the normal
framework of predation under competition
laws. The predation test is much stricter than
the anti-dumping measures which countries
have been using under the WTO.27
• A multilateral competition policy will help fos-
ter competition both nationally and internation-
ally, from which it is suggested that develop-
ing countries would greatly benefit. Perroni and
Whalley (1998) quantify the potential gains of
developing countries from the introduction of
disciplines on competition,
the potential gains for developing countries
could be large, perhaps in the region of 5–6
per cent of national income. This would
make a competition policy negotiation of
potentially more significance to develop-
ing countries than the whole of the trade
disciplines achieved in the Uruguay Round.
(Perroni and Whalley, 1998, p. 493).28
These gains would include those stemming from the
replacement of anti-dumping measures by competi-
tion law, reduction of mark-ups of foreign suppliers
and reduced concentration in domestic markets.
There are, however, powerful arguments against
multilateral disciplines from the perspective of de-
veloping countries. The first is that a multilateral
agreement on competition policy, to be development
friendly, must be highly flexible allowing each coun-
try to determine its competition policy for itself on
the basis of the country’s needs and circumstances.
This implies that if the cost-benefit analysis for a
particular country shows there is no gain from it,
the country need not have a competition policy at
all.
Critics of a multilateral competition policy also
suggest that a main motivation for developed coun-
tries to seek a competition policy agreement is for
reasons of market access to developing countries.
Developed countries would like to have, in addition
to an agreement on competition policy, an interna-
tional agreement on foreign direct investment (FDI).
Under the latter, large advanced country multination-
als would be permitted to invest anywhere they like
in any quantity and at any time without any let or
hindrance from developing country governments. In
addition, once established, the multinationals would
have “national treatment”, i.e. be treated the same
as national firms. An ambitious multilateral agree-
ment on these issues would accord multinationalsG-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 18 20
equal treatment in both pre and post-establishment
phases.
However, such an agreement would be seriously
prejudicial to economic development. In a detailed
analysis of FDI as a source of long-term finance for
developing countries, Singh (2001a) has argued that
unless it is adequately regulated by their govern-
ments, in the particular circumstances of these
countries, where they are subject to frequent inter-
nal and external shocks, it would lead to short and
long-term financial fragility. To avoid this fragility,
it is necessary for developing country governments
to control (a) the timing of the FDI; (b) the total
amount of FDI; as well as (c) the selection of large
projects by multinationals. These measures are
needed to ensure that there is no mismatch of the
time profile of a country’s foreign exchange inflows
and outflows. Such time inconsistency can lead to a
liquidity crisis, which as the experience of Asian
economic crisis shows, may degenerate into solvency
problems with ultimately devastating consequences
for the real economy.29
Multinationals often complain that there is no
“level playing field” between them and the national
corporations which are government supported;
hence, the multinationals demand for “national treat-
ment”. However, the actual situation is quite the
opposite; the playing fields are tilted heavily in fa-
vour of multinationals who have considerable market
power in markets for outputs as well as inputs. The
current international merger movement is making
these fields more unequal even from the perspective
of the large developing country corporations.
The mechanical application of the WTO prin-
ciple of “national treatment” in these circumstances
would clearly lead to perverse results that would both
harm economic development in developing countries
as well as lead to global economic inefficiency. The
magnitude of the latter would be determined by the
extent to which the multinationals financial advan-
tage over domestic firms arises from market power
rather than from genuine economies of scale.
To provide a simple illustration, it should be
perfectly legitimate for a developing country com-
petition authority to allow large domestic firms to
merge so that they can go some way toward compet-
ing on more equal terms with multinationals from
abroad. Even if the amalgamating national firms are
on the horizontal part of the L-shaped static cost
curve, bigger size may still promote dynamic effi-
ciency for the reason that firms need to achieve a
minimum threshold size to finance their own R&D
activities. The competition authority may therefore
quite reasonable deny national treatment to the mul-
tinationals and prohibit their merger activity (because
they are already large enough to achieve either static
or dynamic economies of scale in this sense). In these
circumstances, a violation of the doctrine of national
treatment is likely to be beneficial both to economic
development and to competition.
In view of these serious limitations of multilat-
eral competition policy it is essential to look for
alternative means of international co-operation on
this subject. This is because, as argued earlier, even
if developing countries had development friendly
national competition policies, they would still need
international assistance to restrain anti-competitive
conduct of dominant multinationals as well as to limit
the adverse effects of mega-mergers associated with
the merger movement of the 1990s. The best way, it
seems to me, to provide such help would be through
an International Competition Authority. The char-
acteristics and responsibilities of this Authority
would include the following:
• It would be charged with maintaining fair com-
petition in the world economy and keeping the
markets contestable by ensuring that the barri-
ers-to-entry to late industrializers are kept at
low levels.
• Analogous to the social welfare objectives of
the European Commission, the proposed Inter-
national Authority would be asked to pay at-
tention to the special needs of the developing
countries, to competitive opportunities for small
and medium sized firms, to facilitate transfer
of technology to developing countries and to
ensure fair prices and fair distribution of wealth.
• It would have the authority to scrutinise mega-
mergers and to deter the mega-firms from abus-
ing their dominant position.
• Again on the European Union model, the In-
ternational Competition Authority would be
concerned mainly with cross-border or inter-
national aspects of the workings of competi-
tion. Below the authority, at a national level,
the member countries would have their own na-
tional competition policies.
• For good administrative and practical reasons,
references to the competition authority would
only be permissible in case of anti-competitive
behaviour by corporations above a certain size.Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions 21
The size criterion would normally keep even
most large developing country corporations
outside the direct purview of the competition
authority.
• In relation to the international merger move-
ment, the authority would attempt to limit
growth by merger by large multinationals un-
der its purview. They would be allowed to
merge provided they divest themselves of a
subsidiary of equal value. This would mean that
multinationals would not be able to grow by
mergers, but they could expand through organic
growth or green-field investment. It would not
stop them from taking over other firms provided
they were willing to sever a similar sized sub-
sidiary.
• In the light of the extended discussion of the
international merger movement in Section III,
the main merits of this proposal are as follows.
As mergers, on average, do not appear to im-
prove economic efficiency, and the mega-
mergers have the potential of increasing mar-
ket dominance and reducing contestability, dis-
couraging such mergers would therefore en-
hance global competition and global economic
efficiency while at the same time being distri-
butionally more equitable.
• The governance of the ICA would have proper
representation of developing countries and
would not be dominated by developed coun-
tries.
Although international co-operation on com-
petition policy, in the form outlined above, would
be of particular benefit to developing countries, it
also has useful features to assist the large multina-
tional corporations. The International Competition
Authority would for example be able to provide
multinationals under its purview with unambiguous
decisions on mergers and other competition related
matters. Instead of being subject to the often con-
flicting decisions of many different jurisdictions
(e.g., the United States, the European Union, Japan,
and overtime countries like India and China) Inter-
national Competition Authority’s rulings would
prevail overall national and regional jurisdiction.30
There is no illusion that an international agree-
ment of the above kind would immediately be
acceptable to advanced countries. Nevertheless, it
indicates the nature of economic arrangements in this
area which would best serve developmental needs
of poor countries. It may, however, be helpful to pro-
ceed to the establishment of the ICA in stages. At
the first stage, the authority may have no coercive
powers, but simply be able to monitor and to report
on abuses of dominant market positions, on mergers,
and the authority’s other competition objectives.31
Such monitoring would itself be beneficial to de-
veloping countries as it would provide them with
information on cartels and on market power abuses
of multinationals. Developing countries would find
it difficult to acquire such information otherwise.
With the experience gained from this kind of lim-
ited international co-operation, nations can, over
time, work towards greater co-operation by giving
ICA the necessary powers to enforce its rules.
There is finally the question whether ICA
should nevertheless be an integral part of the WTO
or should it be a stand-alone authority. In addition to
the reasons mentioned earlier in the discussion of
the multilateral competition policy, there are also
other considerations that would suggest the latter
would be the better option. This is in part because
questions of competition policy go much beyond
those related to international trade. Further, WTO
does not have the expertise to be the world’s “FTC”.
Moreover, the primary objectives of competition
policy tend to be rather different from those of the
promotion of free trade through measures such as
market access and national treatment. Since, as in-
dicated above, the latter concepts are not very helpful
to developing countries it would be best to keep the
two institutions (the WTO and the ICA) separate.
VI. Conclusion
The main points of this essay have been pre-
sented in the Abstract. Its central message is to
suggest that developing countries at the WTO are
faced with a serious difficulty in discussions on com-
petition policy as well as on other similar issues as
long as the whole discourse is expressed in terms of
the WTO concepts and language. These are inad-
equate to reflect the developmental concerns of
emerging countries. Developing countries need to
develop the appropriate language and concepts
within which their concerns can be properly articu-
lated. Hopefully this paper has made a small
contribution in that direction.
The Preamble to the WTO notes that “trade and
economic endeavour should be conducted with a
view to raising the standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing vol-G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 18 22
ume of real income and effective demand”. It is fur-
ther stated that “there is need for positive efforts
designed to ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least-developed among them, secure
a share in the growth in international trade com-
mensurate with the needs of their economic devel-
opment” (quoted in Rodrik, 2001). Full employment
and economic development are not only the ultimate
goals of the WTO; these have also been repeatedly
endorsed by the international community. In 1995,
117 Heads of State or Government attending the
Copenhagen Social Summit endorsed the Copenha-
gen Declaration, which put primary emphasis on the
promotion of full employment and poverty reduc-
tion. More recently, similar declaration have been
made at the Millennium Summit at the United Na-
tions and other fora. Indeed, the right to a decent
living has virtually acquired the status of a univer-
sal human right.
If experience and analysis show that the pri-
mary goals of the WTO are being harmed rather than
helped by specific measures such as TRIMS, or the
equal application to all countries of a particular pro-
cedural principle such as national treatment, it is the
latter which should be changed. It is the primary
goals rather than the procedural rules of an interna-
tional organization that should dominate especially
as the former are widely endorsed by the world com-
munity as a whole.
In this spirit the paper has put forward a pro-
posal for a development friendly International
Competition Authority in order to control anti-com-
petitive conduct of the world’s large multinational
corporations (above a certain threshold of size) as
well as to control their propensity to grow by take-
overs and mergers. In order to maintain contestability
and efficiency of international markets it is proposed
that the large multinationals should be allowed to
take over another company only if they sell off a
subsidiary of similar value. Thus, even the largest
multinationals are not stopped from growing pro-
vided they expand their size by green-field
investment. Neither are they stopped from taking
over other firms provided they are able to sell off
equal value subsidiaries, i.e. they cannot grow by
mergers or take-overs. It is argued here that these
institutional arrangements would both be more effi-
cient as well as more equitable compared with the
present situation. It is, however, recognized that the
advanced countries are not yet ready to cede sover-
eignty for such close international co-operation. The
evolution towards the establishment of the ICA
could, therefore occur in stages. As a first step the
Authority could be entrusted only with fact-finding
and monitoring anti-competitive behaviour and
threats to the contestability of international markets.
This could evolve over time into deeper North-South
co-operation and the full-fledged establishment of
the ICA according to the principles outlined in the
paper.
Notes
1 This WTO Working Group on Trade and Competition
Policy (WGTCP) has been meeting under the chairman-
ship of Professor Frédéric Jenny for the last four years.
Their work will be commented upon later in the paper.
2 The United States takes a more measured stance. The
United States Trade Representative’s Fact Sheet summa-
rising the results of the Doha ministerial noted in rela-
tion to competition policy that a two-stage “modest” ne-
gotiation was agreed upon. The first stage would seek
clarification of “core principles”, including transparency,
non-discrimination and procedural fairness. At the sec-
ond stage the “timing and specific content” of the nego-
tiations will be decided.
3 The account of the Doha ministerial meeting in this para-
graph and the following one comes from Bridges (Inter-
national Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development),
Year 5, No. 9, November/December 2001, p. 6.
4 Apart from the WTO, the CUTS Centre for International
Trade, Economics and Environment reports that compe-
tition policy is the on the agenda of the proposed Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) as well as the Euro-
pean Union / Africa, Caribbean, Pacific Grouping (EU /
ACP).
5 For the structural analysis of the Asian crisis see for ex-
ample Greenspan (1998), Phelps (1999), and IMF (1998).
The structural analysis of the Asian crisis is of course
neither necessarily accurate nor universally accepted. For
a strong rebuttal see, Singh (1999) and Singh and Weisse
(1999); for alternative analyses see among others Radelet
and Sachs (1998); Feldstein (1998, 2002); Stiglitz (1999).
6 See de Soto (1989).
7 The first bias arises from the fact that the data in table 2
pertain to size of plants rather than enterprises. This bias
would, however, understate relatively the small firms’
contribution to the economies of developing countries.
This is because there are likely to be more multi-plant
enterprises in developed than in developing countries.
Second, the data by and large consider only the formal
sector. The informal sector in developing countries is
typically very considerably larger than that in advanced
countries. This bias would also therefore operate in the
same direction as the first.
8 A distinction is often made between competition law and
competition policy – the latter being a wider concept en-
compassing elements of industrial policy among other
things (see for example Hoekman and Kostecki (2001)).
Here, formal competition policy is used in the narrow
sense. The broader concept employed here is that of in-
dustrial policy.
9 These estimates are reported in World Bank (2002).
10 For a fuller discussion of these issues see World Bank
(1993), and Amsden (2001). For a theoretical analysis,
see Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983b).Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions 23
11 This is a rather different conception of competition from
that involved in the Arrow-Debreu formulation of gen-
eral equilibrium in a decentralized market economy. In
this conception, a competitive equilibrium exists under
certain specified conditions that leads to a Pareto-opti-
mal allocation of resources. However, the notion of com-
petition described in the text is rather different: it is con-
cerned with the common-sense understanding of compe-
tition as an incentive to elicit maximum individual or
organization effort.
12 See further Amsden and Singh (1994), and Laffont (1998).
13 See further Vickers (1994) and Nickell (1996).
14 There is a vast literature on this subject. See Amsden
(1989), Rodrik (1994), Singh (1995) and Wade (1990)
among others.
15 The classic reference here is Piore and Sabel (1984). See
also Best (1990).
16 See Pollit (1999) for a useful review of the literature on
the subject.
17 The United Kingdom had a similarly large merger wave
roughly around the same time. Parenthetically, the best
historical data on mergers is available for the United
States and the United Kingdom. The two countries have
similar institutions and corporate laws which allow use-
ful comparisons between them. International compari-
sons involving other countries are always more difficult
because of differences in corporate law as well as the
definition of what constitutes a “merger”. See further
Hughes and Singh (1980).
18 Best (1990), p. 104.
19 For recent reviews of the literature see Mueller (1997)
and Tichy (2001).
20 A few studies have found a small increase in profitability
after mergers. However, 90 per cent of studies have found
either no change or reduced profits.
21 For a general discussion and quantitative analysis of the
cartels, which have been detected and presented during
the last two decades, see Evenett, Levenstein and Suslow
(2001).
22 On the incidence of cartels in the 1930s and the post-war
period, see Mason (1946) and Scherer (1994). On the
reasons for the rise in mergers and take-overs in the post-
war period, see Singh (1992, 1993).
23 The Economist (2002).
24 As Stiglitz rightly points out, one needs to distinguish
between a Suharto and a Mobuto.
25 According to Audretsch, Baumol and Burke (2001), the
dynamic efficiency perspective of competition policy and
modern theoretical analysis requires consideration of is-
sues such as the appropriate ease of entry; appropriate
inter-firm coordination; innovation, trade and monopoly
power; anti-competitive innovation; monopoly in inno-
vative markets; and price discrimination when R&D costs
are substantial and continuing. In other words, a host of
dynamic factors must be analyzed. This is the authors’
recommendation for an appropriate competition policy
in advanced countries. What MITI did in Japan during
its period of high growth was to adapt such considera-
tions to their particular circumstances.
26 Similarly in 1986, the OECD issued guidelines concern-
ing restrictive business practices by multinationals. Un-
der the guidelines, which again were advisory rather than
legally enforceable, multinational enterprises were en-
joined to refrain from a wide range of anti-competitive
activities including abuses of intellectual property rights,
predatory behaviour, competition reducing acquisitions,
etc. (See further, OECD 1986; Scherer, 1994).
27 Stiglitz presents a recent report on United States anti-
dumping cases which suggests that, if these had been
subject to the equivalent United States competition policy
standard of predation, more than 90 per cent of them
would have failed. (Stiglitz, 1999).
28 Quoted in Correa (1999).
29 These arguments for permitting developing countries to
be able to monitor and to regulate FDI flows are further
complemented by considerations of technology transfer
and spillover benefits. Research shows that both of those
occur best when FDI is carefully regulated and fits well
into a country’s development program. See further Singh
(2001a); Singh (forthcoming).
30 For the difficulties involved for corporate decision mak-
ing as a consequences of overlapping jurisdictions of
competition authorities of different countries, see “Trade
and Competition: Towards a global response”. http://
trade-info.cec.eu.int/europa/2001newround/com.htm.
31 Scherer, 1994, makes a similar point in relation to his pro-
posal for an international agreement on competition policy.
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